Four Belaruses

In the fifth year of the war one can state that a stable parity at the front reduces the likelihood that either side achieves its maximal goals. For Russia this means the scenario of a complete seizure of Ukraine is constrained; for Ukraine, a rapid return to the 1991 borders is made difficult. Absent a sharp turning point, the outcome of the war will be a compromise, incomplete for all sides.

For Belarus this narrows the near-term range of scenarios. Without a Ukrainian victory the «golden» scenario, described earlier in the article on the Finlandization of Belarus, is not fully blocked, but becomes less likely in the near term. Without a Russian victory the rapid realization of the «black» scenario becomes harder. As a result, the most probable outcome is the «grey» corridor. The question of this article is no longer whether the grey scenario is real, but in what words its most probable form can be described.

Methodologically, the article proceeds from a simple thesis: the political future can be provisionally described as a set of features that different actors regard as desirable, admissible, or inadmissible.

In the process of goal-setting an actor singles out a certain state it wishes to achieve, describes its features, gives it a name, and relates it to the existing state in order to understand what is needed to turn the current state into the desired one. This process resembles the process of cognition, in which a subject singles out an object, describes its properties (for example, «a polygon in which all angles are right and all sides are equal»), names it («a square»), and places it within a system of concepts («a plane geometric figure») in order to grasp clearly the difference both between objects within that class and in comparison with objects of other classes.

In both goal-setting and cognition a person uses one and the same instrument: the language they speak. The difference between these processes lies in their direction. Cognition is turned toward what already exists or is presumed to exist; goal-setting, toward what is still to be created, achieved, or prevented. For this reason the political future cannot be predicted like a physical event, but one can attempt to reconstruct (i. e. to cognize) it by studying and intersecting the competing languages of goal-setting.

This experiment is therefore not a forecast in the strict sense. It is an analytical model in which the future of Belarus is treated as a set of features already present in the motivations of actors. The central question is formulated as follows: do the clouds of features defining an «acceptable Belarus» intersect across different actors, and if so, in what words is that intersection described?

To find an answer, four initial archetypes present in the Belarus-centric political discourse are used. Real Belarus is the starting point of the analysis: a state deeply dependent on Russia, preserving an internal repressive system and drawn into the war as territory and infrastructure.

The fourth archetype is used not as an independent forecast, but as a negative test. For each actor it is important to determine where the boundary lies between still-acceptable separateness and the actual disappearance of Belarus as an agent. If an actor is prepared to accept the preservation of the flag and the map while losing the capacity to act independently, its «acceptable Belarus» approaches the vanished one. If such a loss is unacceptable to it, then its minimum contains the feature of separateness.

The main object of analysis is not the ideal clouds, but precisely the acceptable ones. The ideals of actors almost inevitably conflict. Their minimums, by contrast, may intersect.

The primary candidate for a common core is reliability, predictability, or the reduction of uncertainty. Different actors phrase this demand in different words: Russia needs a Belarus that does not drift West and does not become a threat from the rear; Ukraine, a neighbour from whose territory no second front arises; Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia, a border that produces no migration, military, or air risks; the EU, a periphery that does not export crises; the United States, a controllable regional element suitable for deals; China, a logistically useful and politically stable node; Lukashenka, a system that reproduces his power; the democratic forces, a country that remains separate and does not foreclose the path to a democratic future.

However, «reliability» is too broad a word. For Moscow reliability may mean control; for Ukraine, the absence of threat; for the democratic forces, the preservation of agency outside Russian absorption. For this reason «reliability» in this model is not a conclusion but an input hypothesis. It must be broken down into more concrete features and tested for whether they retain a common meaning when decoded.

For such a test the «word ↔ deed» probe is used. What matters is not only what an actor declares, but also what actions it takes. Three types of correspondence are possible:

The model's summary matrix: for each actor — the ideal Belarus, the acceptable minimum, the type of gap between word and deed, the relation to the archetype of disappearance, and the contribution to a possible common core. The cards expand.

4.1. Lukashenka: separateness as a regime resource

For Lukashenka the ideal remains a recognized state under his personal rule. His rhetoric of sovereignty does not mean independence from external dependencies; rather it means the diversification of those dependencies: depending on several patrons at once so as not to depend entirely on a single one. The minimum is a separate Belarus in which his power is reproduced. Here separateness is valuable not as a national-democratic principle, but as a bargaining resource: without statehood the regime loses its role as an intermediary between external players.

The regime's actions fit a strategy of multi-patronage: Russian dependence is supplemented by Chinese, American, Gulf, and broader «Global South» directions. The potash storyline and the Nezhinsky GOK serve as a convenient model of this logic — a detailed reconstruction of the Russian-Chinese-American layer is given in the article on potash, sanctions, and transit. For the purposes of this text one conclusion suffices: the regime tries to monetize its residual agency, turning economic assets, prisoners, transit, and negotiating signals into elements of a single package.

Lukashenka offers external actors predictability through irremovability. This version is unacceptable to the democratic forces, but it partly intersects with other actors' demand for managed risk. Lukashenka's Belarus is therefore not the complete opposite of a possible common core; it is one of its authoritarian readings.

4.2. Russia: reliability as control

For Russia the ideal option is a Belarus embedded in the Russian military, political, and economic system. The forms may differ: the Union State, military infrastructure, a single security space, de facto vassalization. The meaning is one: Belarus must not be an independent strategic agent against Moscow. The minimum is a loyal neighbour without Western drift: under certain conditions a nominally separate Belarus may be enough for Moscow, provided its foreign-policy and military orientation remains under control.

In the Russian case the gap between word and deed is minimal. The rhetoric of a «brotherly people» is paired not with recognition of independence, but with the practice of integration, the military use of territory, and economic tethering. This is not a contradiction but two languages of one project: the cultural-symbolic and the institutional.

Russia is the principal test of the entire hypothesis. If its minimum is only a controllable Belarus, then the word «reliability» becomes a homonym: for Moscow it means dependence, for most of the other actors it means a limitation on Russia's military function. Russia therefore either enters the core in part, on the terms of a «non-Western but separate» Belarus, or falls out of it as an actor whose demands are incompatible with real separateness.

4.3. Ukraine: safety as the absence of a second front

Ukraine views Belarus not only as territory of risk, but also as a potential strategic project. In the Ukrainian ideal cloud, Belarus should leave the Russian orbit, become a European state, and cease to be part of the Russian military infrastructure. In a more ambitious version, Ukraine could become a political and geopolitical role model for a future Belarus. Kyiv's minimum is simpler: no second front should arise from Belarusian territory.

Ukraine simultaneously supports the democratic opposition, strengthens the sanctions line, and refuses to ease the potash pressure, even when such easing is promoted by the United States. This shows that Kyiv is not a passive object of American policy: it has its own Belarus strategy. At the same time, the Ukrainian warnings and Minsk's counter-threats of late May–early June 2026 reveal a minimal intersection: neither Kyiv nor Lukashenka needs a direct Belarusian-Ukrainian front.

Ukraine contributes the feature «non-aggressive» to the core. The stronger Ukrainian position is that under Lukashenka it is already impossible to separate Belarus from Russia; in that case a real core is attainable only after a change of power.

4.4. Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia: a values goal and a securitized border

For the neighbouring states the ideal would be a democratic Belarus that is not a source of military, migration, or intelligence threat. Poland and Lithuania are at once hubs of the Belarusian diaspora and media, so the values dimension here is significant. But the minimum is a controllable border: the regime type of Belarus turns out to be secondary to whether it produces crises.

The securitization of the border has become a policy in its own right. Buffer zones, flight restrictions, the closure or restriction of border crossings, as well as Lithuania's caution on the question of potash transit show that when values solidarity collides with security and economic costs, the harder logic of risk prevails.

The neighbours offer the cleanest reading of the core: Belarus must be predictable and must not export instability. The country's internal order matters to them, but at the moment of crisis it yields to the security of the border.

4.5. The European Union: a normative maximum and a controllable periphery

The EU articulates the most normatively saturated position: human rights, the release of political prisoners, non-recognition of the repressive political system, support for a democratic transition. The minimum is a Belarus that creates no new crises on the Union's eastern periphery. In this sense European policy constantly oscillates between sanctions-driven normativity and the pragmatism of de-escalation.

The European line is not monolithic. Formal sanctions pressure coexists with soundings by individual states, judicial rulings, fatigue from a long conflict, and differing positions within the EU. Macron's call to Lukashenka and reports of possible non-public contacts between the French side and Minsk matter not as recognition of the regime, but as an indicator: even while preserving its normative rhetoric, the EU is compelled to test channels of de-escalation.

The EU adds to the core the feature of the absence of escalation. A democratic Belarus remains the ideal; the acceptable minimum becomes a Belarus that does not turn into a permanent source of crisis.

4.6. The United States: a deal, a buffer, and a testable hypothesis

The Trump administration has no articulated doctrine of an ideal Belarus. It therefore has to be reconstructed indirectly — through the transactional foreign-policy frame and through the expert idea of turning Belarus from a Russian asset into a buffer element of European security. Trump has already floated the idea of a buffer state between Russia and NATO with respect to Ukraine. Belarus's place in such a logic is almost identical to Ukraine's, with two qualifications: Belarus must not be an independent military force and must at the same time serve as a channel for a deal with Moscow.

The U.S. minimum is a Belarus with which deals can be struck: on prisoners, sanctions, transit, raw materials, security, and diplomatic channels. A broader list of the regime's potential negotiating assets is examined separately by the authors in the article «More Than Potash»; what matters here is not the catalogue of assets but the logic: Minsk is trying to sell not a single good, but a portfolio of functions.

The American line looks like a «carrot and stick», but its result is ambiguous. The humanitarian track of releasing prisoners may coincide with the interests of the democratic forces; the commercial track on potash and banks may strengthen the regime and conflict with the sanctions policy of Ukraine and part of the EU. Two interpretations are therefore possible: either the United States unintentionally deepens Minsk's dependence on Moscow, or it deliberately creates a track for a broader exchange in which transit and the security of the neighbours become objects of bargaining.

If the buffer hypothesis is correct, the United States contributes to the core the feature of a stabilizing regional function. But this conclusion remains a hypothesis: it must be tested against further actions, not against presumed motives.

4.7. China: stability without conflict with Moscow

For China the ideal Belarus is a stable logistical, industrial, and political node on the western direction. In rhetoric this is framed as an «all-weather» partnership, membership in the SCO, industrial projects, and support for multipolarity. The minimum is a solvent and predictable Belarus that creates no conflict with Russia: Beijing is interested in profit, but not so much as to pay for it with a confrontation with Moscow.

China acts cautiously. It deepens its economic and institutional presence, but does not cross the lines that would make Belarus an independent Chinese counterweight to Russia. Russia's dependence on China reinforces the transitive structure: Minsk depends on Moscow, Moscow on Beijing, and Beijing prefers the stability of this chain to its abrupt revision.

China strengthens the formula «profitable + stable», but does not form an independent political vector against the Russian veto. It widens the grey formula rather than bringing the golden one closer.

The Belarusian democratic forces cannot be described as a homogeneous camp. They are united by a rejection of the disappearance of Belarus as a separate agent, but divided by the question of admissible methods: pressure and non-recognition, or dialogue and de-escalation. For the purposes of the model it is useful to distinguish two tracks.

The Tsikhanouskaya Office and the United Transitional Cabinet are inside the humanitarian track of the deal: the release of prisoners, coordination with Western partners, international advocacy. But in the commercial track — above all on the question of potash and the easing of sanctions — they find themselves in a position of opposition. This is not a contradiction but a separation of two logics: the humanitarian result can be accepted, the commercial legitimation of the regime blocked.

Kalesnikava's line and Babaryka's place the emphasis on dialogue, reducing isolation, and returning Belarus to the European agenda through gradual unfreezing. This position draws sharp criticism, but analytically it should not be reduced to capitulation. It proceeds from the same basic goal — to preserve Belarus as a separate agent — but assesses the path to that goal differently.

Maria Kalesnikava

Member of the Coordination Council presidium

Musician and politician, coordinator of Viktar Babaryka's campaign team and one of the leaders of the 2020 protests. In September 2020 she tore up her passport at the border, refusing forced expulsion from the country; sentenced to 11 years in prison. Has urged the EU not to abandon dialogue with Minsk for the sake of freeing prisoners and reducing isolation.

Viktar Babaryka

Former head of Belgazprombank, founder of the Razam party

Banker and politician, the highest-polling contender in the 2020 election, barred from registration. He was sentenced to 14 years in prison in a case human rights defenders consider political. His team presented the Razam party in Brussels, betting on a gradual return of Belarus to the European agenda.

Pazniak's position is important in that it demonstrates an intersection from an unexpected side. In his reasoning about Minsk's contacts with external players a pragmatic motive appears: drawing Belarus into international negotiations may increase its agency and thereby reduce the risk of losing the state. This does not bring him politically closer to the regime, but it reveals a shared minimal feature: the state must survive.

Zianon Pazniak

Co-founder of the Belarusian Popular Front, leader of the Conservative Christian Party

Archaeologist and politician, researcher of the Kurapaty killing fields, presidential candidate in 1994. In exile since 1996. A consistent advocate of the national-democratic line and a critic of both the regime and parts of the democratic forces; he has noted that involving Minsk in international negotiations may increase Belarus's agency and reduce the risk of losing the state.

Thus, within the democratic field there is a common minimum — a separate Belarus — and a unique feature that no other actor holds as a mandatory condition — democratic. It is precisely this that distinguishes the democratic strategy from a simple strategy of preserving separateness.

Even before «reliability» is broken down into separate features, several visible intersections of the acceptable clouds can already be noted. These intersections do not yet prove the existence of a common core, but they show why the negative archetype of a «vanished Belarus» matters for the model: it is precisely by pushing off from it that different actors converge on the minimal feature of separateness, even though they fill it with different political content.

The primary hypothesis of «reliability» needs to be broken down. The model singles out seven words, each describing a separate dimension of an acceptable Belarus. Each word is assessed along two axes: breadth — how many actors it suits, and resistance to decoding — whether the word retains a common meaning once one unpacks what exactly each actor invests in it.

The model reveals four main lines of rupture. Most incompatibilities are linked either to Russian control or to the irremovability of the regime. Among the remaining actors the divergences are significant, but they more often admit of compromise.

From the robust words several formulas of an acceptable future can be assembled.

The grey formula (#2) is the default equilibrium. It can be built by the regime, by the United States as a transactional actor, and by China as a user of stability; Moscow can tolerate it if separateness remains nominal; the EU may not necessarily stop it if coordination is absent. The golden formula (#4) requires adding the feature «democratic», which does not appear automatically.

If the core «separate + non-aggressive» is compatible with the interests of most actors, the main question is whether this majority can impose it on Moscow. A military mechanism is unlikely. A cost mechanism is possible: holding full control over Belarus must become more expensive for Russia than tolerating a nominally separate, non-Western, and non-aggressive Belarus. Such factors include Russia's exhaustion in the war, the growth of its dependence on China, the costs of sanctions, the possible decoupling of part of Belarusian exports from Russian ports, and the persistence of Western interest in the Belarusian question.

But this logic has two limitations. First, Russia must be sufficiently weakened. Second, the majority of actors must coordinate. As of June 2026 both conditions are met only partly: interests intersect, but they do not form a single agent of action.

The previous sections describe the clouds as a static map. But the clouds are tied to actors, and actors change. The key temporal variable is therefore a possible power transition in Belarus over a horizon of several years.

The 2022 constitutional reform and the role of the All-Belarusian People's Assembly created a construction reminiscent of the «elbasy» mechanism: the incumbent leader can formally redistribute powers while retaining superstructural control. However, the Kazakh precedent of Nazarbayev–Tokayev shows the limits of such insurance: in a personalist system the successor is not obliged to preserve the safety of the predecessor once real power has been obtained.

This lesson matters for all participants. For Lukashenka his own successor does not guarantee safety. For external actors a managed transition does not guarantee predictability. For the democratic forces a transition by itself does not mean democratization.

For the robust core «separate + non-aggressive» a change of power is not a mandatory condition. Such a formula can exist even under Lukashenka: the regime needs separateness as a resource, and direct entry into the war against Ukraine would be suicidal for it.

For the golden formula «separate + non-aggressive + democratic» a transition is necessary. But not just any transition solves the task: dynastic, elbasy, or puppet variants keep Belarus in the grey or black zone. Only a compromise transition with real security guarantees and institutional content leads to the golden formula.

A paradox is possible: with a sufficiently strong weakening of Russia and a rise in personal risks, a compromise transition with external guarantees may turn out to be safer for Lukashenka than his own successor. But as of June 2026 this is a dormant hypothesis. The regime's behaviour points not to preparing an exit, but to seeking to retain power and to widen the field of bargaining.

The combinatorics show that separateness may be needed not only by the democratic forces. From this follow six practical lines.

The ideals of actors block one another, so the most probable outcome should be sought not in the ideals but in the zone of the acceptable minimum. This zone is described by the formula «separate + non-aggressive». It is neither a good nor a bad outcome in itself: it is a structural minimum, the opposite of the archetype of a «vanished Belarus». The same formula may be a step toward democratization, or it may freeze into the form of a grey authoritarian equilibrium.

Prepared on the basis of open sources, the authors' previous project models, and an analytical reconstruction of the actors' motivations as of June 2026. All scenario formulas are an authorial model, not an established fact or a forecast with guaranteed probability.