Four Belaruses

In the fifth year of the war one can state that a stable parity at the front reduces the likelihood that either side achieves its maximal goals. For Russia this means the scenario of a complete seizure of Ukraine is constrained; for Ukraine, a rapid return to the 1991 borders is made difficult. Absent a sharp turning point, the outcome of the war will be a compromise, incomplete for all sides.

For Belarus this narrows the near-term range of scenarios. Without a Ukrainian victory the «golden» scenario, described earlier in the article on the Finlandization of Belarus, is not fully blocked, but becomes less likely in the near term. Without a Russian victory the rapid realization of the «black» scenario becomes harder. As a result, the most probable outcome is the «grey» corridor: a formally independent Belarus with no agent capable of an independent course. The question of this article is no longer whether the grey scenario is real, but in what words its most probable form can be described.

Methodologically, the article proceeds from a simple thesis: the political future can be provisionally described as a set of features that different actors regard as desirable, admissible, or inadmissible.

In the process of goal-setting an actor singles out a certain state it wishes to achieve, describes its features, gives it a name, and relates it to the existing state in order to understand what is needed to turn the current state into the desired one. This process resembles the process of cognition, in which a subject singles out an object, describes its properties (for example, «a polygon in which all angles are right and all sides are equal»), names it («a square»), and places it within a system of concepts («a plane geometric figure») in order to grasp clearly the difference both between objects within that class and in comparison with objects of other classes.

In both goal-setting and cognition a person uses one and the same instrument: the language they speak. The difference between these processes lies in their direction. Cognition is turned toward what already exists or is presumed to exist; goal-setting, toward what is still to be created, achieved, or prevented. For this reason the political future cannot be predicted like a physical event, but one can attempt to reconstruct (i. e. to cognize) it by studying and intersecting the competing languages of goal-setting.

This experiment is therefore not a forecast in the strict sense. It is an analytical model in which the future of Belarus is treated as a set of features already present in the motivations of actors. The central question is formulated as follows: do the clouds of features defining an «acceptable Belarus» intersect across different actors, and if so, in what words is that intersection described?

To find an answer, four initial archetypes present in Belarusian political debate are used. Real Belarus is the starting point of the analysis: a state deeply dependent on Russia, preserving an internal repressive system and drawn into the war as territory and infrastructure.

The fourth archetype is used not as an independent forecast, but as a negative test. For each actor it is important to determine where the boundary lies between still-acceptable separateness and the actual disappearance of Belarus as an agent. If an actor is prepared to accept the preservation of the flag and the map while losing the capacity to act independently, its «acceptable Belarus» approaches the vanished one. If such a loss is unacceptable to it, then its minimum contains the feature of separateness.

The main object of analysis is not the ideal clouds, but precisely the acceptable ones. The ideals of actors almost inevitably conflict. Their minimums, by contrast, may intersect.

In this article the common core is the set of features that belongs to the acceptable minimums of almost all actors; it is the «fifth Belarus» of the title. The primary candidate for the common core is reliability, that is, reduced uncertainty for external actors. Different actors phrase this demand in different words: Russia needs a Belarus that does not drift West and does not become a threat from the rear; Ukraine, a neighbour from whose territory no second front arises; Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia, a border that produces no migration, military, or air risks; the EU, a periphery that does not export crises; the United States, a predictable partner suitable for deals; China, a logistically useful and politically stable node; Lukashenka, a system that reproduces his power; the democratic forces, a country that remains separate and does not foreclose the path to a democratic future.

However, «reliability» is too broad a word. For Moscow reliability may mean control; for Ukraine, the absence of threat; for the democratic forces, the preservation of agency outside Russian absorption. For this reason «reliability» in this model is not a conclusion but an input hypothesis. It must be broken down into more concrete features and tested for whether they retain a common meaning when decoded.

For this the «word ↔ deed» check is used. What matters is not only what an actor declares, but also what actions it takes. Three types of correspondence are possible:

The model's summary matrix: for each actor — the ideal Belarus, the acceptable minimum, the type of correspondence between word and deed, the relation to the archetype of disappearance, and the contribution to a possible common core. The cards expand.

The Belarusian democratic forces cannot be described as a homogeneous camp. They are united by a rejection of the disappearance of Belarus as a separate agent, but divided by the question of admissible methods: pressure and non-recognition, or dialogue and de-escalation. For the purposes of the model it is useful to distinguish two approaches.

The Tsikhanouskaya Office and the United Transitional Cabinet are inside the humanitarian track of the deal: the release of prisoners, coordination with Western partners, international human-rights work. But in the commercial track — above all on the question of potash and the easing of sanctions — they find themselves in a position of opposition. This is not a contradiction but a separation of two logics: the humanitarian result can be accepted, the commercial legitimation of the regime blocked.

Kalesnikava's line and Babaryka's place the emphasis on dialogue, reducing isolation, and returning Belarus to the European agenda through gradual unfreezing. This position draws sharp criticism, but analytically it should not be reduced to capitulation. It proceeds from the same basic goal — to preserve Belarus as a separate agent — but assesses the path to that goal differently.

Maria Kalesnikava

Member of the Coordination Council presidium

Musician and politician, coordinator of Viktar Babaryka's campaign team and one of the leaders of the 2020 protests. In September 2020 she tore up her passport at the border, refusing forced expulsion from the country; sentenced to 11 years in prison. Has urged the EU not to abandon dialogue with Minsk for the sake of freeing prisoners and reducing isolation.

Viktar Babaryka

Former head of Belgazprombank, founder of the Razam party

Banker and politician, the highest-polling contender in the 2020 election, barred from registration. He was sentenced to 14 years in prison in a case human rights defenders consider political. His team presented the Razam party in Brussels, betting on a gradual return of Belarus to the European agenda.

Pazniak's position is important in that it demonstrates an intersection from an unexpected side. In his reasoning about Minsk's contacts with external players a pragmatic motive appears: drawing Belarus into international negotiations may increase its agency and thereby reduce the risk of losing the state. This does not bring him politically closer to the regime, but it reveals a shared minimal feature: the state must survive.

Zianon Pazniak

Co-founder of the Belarusian Popular Front, leader of the Conservative Christian Party

Archaeologist and politician, researcher of the Kurapaty killing fields, presidential candidate in 1994. In exile since 1996. A consistent advocate of the national-democratic line and a critic of both the regime and parts of the democratic forces; he has noted that involving Minsk in international negotiations may increase Belarus's agency and reduce the risk of losing the state.

Thus, the democratic forces share a common minimum — a separate Belarus — and a unique feature that no other actor holds as a mandatory condition — democratic. It is precisely this that distinguishes the democratic strategy from a simple strategy of preserving separateness.

Even before «reliability» is broken down into separate features, several visible intersections of the acceptable clouds can already be noted. These intersections do not yet prove the existence of a common core, but they show why the negative archetype of a «vanished Belarus» matters for the model: it is precisely by pushing off from it that different actors converge on the minimal feature of separateness, even though they fill it with different political content.

The primary hypothesis of «reliability» needs to be broken down. The model singles out seven words — candidates for the common core; each describes a separate dimension of an acceptable Belarus. The democratic forces appear in the matrix as two approaches, so there are nine positions. Each word is assessed along two axes: breadth — how many actors it suits, and resistance to decoding — whether the word retains a common meaning once one unpacks what exactly each actor invests in it.

The model reveals four main incompatibilities. Most of them are linked either to Russian control or to the irremovability of the regime. Among the remaining actors the divergences are significant, but they more often admit of compromise.

From the robust words several formulas of an acceptable future can be assembled.

The grey formula (No. 2) is the default equilibrium. It can be built by the regime, by the United States as a transactional actor, and by China as a user of stability; Moscow can tolerate it if separateness remains nominal; the EU may not necessarily stop it if coordination is absent. The golden formula (No. 4) requires adding the feature «democratic», which does not appear automatically. As in the article on Finlandization, the golden scenario opens only in a narrow corridor where five factors coincide: an exhausted Russia, a transition, institutions, identity, and Western support. Neutrality enters it as part of Finlandization, but does not replace democratic content.

If the core «separate + non-aggressive» is compatible with the interests of most actors, the main question is whether this majority can impose it on Moscow. A military mechanism is unlikely. A cost mechanism is possible: holding full control over Belarus must become more expensive for Russia than tolerating a nominally separate, non-Western, and non-aggressive Belarus. Such factors include Russia's exhaustion in the war, the growth of its dependence on China, the costs of sanctions, the possible decoupling of part of Belarusian exports from Russian ports, and the persistence of Western interest in the Belarusian question.

But this logic has two limitations. First, Russia must be sufficiently weakened. Second, the majority of actors must coordinate. As of June 2026 both conditions are met only partly: interests intersect, but they do not form a single agent of action.

The previous sections describe the clouds as a static map. But the clouds are tied to actors, and actors change. The key temporal variable is therefore a possible power transition in Belarus over a horizon of several years.

The 2022 constitutional reform and the role of the All-Belarusian People's Assembly (ABPA) created a construction reminiscent of the «elbasy» mechanism (after Nazarbayev's title, «leader of the nation»): the incumbent leader can formally redistribute powers while retaining superstructural control. However, the Kazakh precedent of Nazarbayev–Tokayev shows the limits of such insurance: in a personalist system the successor is not obliged to preserve the safety of the predecessor once real power has been obtained.

This lesson matters for all participants. For Lukashenka his own successor does not guarantee safety. For external actors a managed transition does not guarantee predictability. For the democratic forces a transition by itself does not mean democratization.

For the common core «separate + non-aggressive» a change of power is not a mandatory condition. Such a formula can exist even under Lukashenka: the regime needs separateness as a resource, and direct entry into the war against Ukraine would be suicidal for it.

For the golden formula «separate + non-aggressive + democratic» a transition is necessary. But not just any transition solves the task: dynastic, elbasy, or puppet variants keep Belarus in the grey or black zone. Only a compromise transition with real security guarantees and institutional content leads to the golden formula.

A paradox is possible: with a sufficiently strong weakening of Russia and a rise in personal risks, a compromise transition with external guarantees may turn out to be safer for Lukashenka than his own successor. But as of June 2026 this is a dormant hypothesis. The regime's behaviour points not to preparing an exit, but to seeking to retain power and to widen the field of bargaining.

The combination of formulas shows that separateness may be needed not only by the democratic forces. From this follow six practical tasks.

The ideals of actors block one another, so the most probable outcome should be sought not in the ideals but in the intersection of the acceptable minimums — the common core. That is the fifth Belarus: «separate + non-aggressive». In itself it is neither good nor bad, but it holds by a thread: its separateness may remain nominal, and little separates it from the archetype of a «vanished Belarus». The same formula may be a step toward democratization, or it may freeze into the form of a grey authoritarian equilibrium.

Prepared on the basis of open sources, the authors' previous project models, and an analytical reconstruction of the actors' motivations as of June 2026. All scenario formulas are an authorial model, not an established fact or a forecast with guaranteed probability.