Pavel Usov writes that in 10–15 years a democratic Belarus may face a paradoxical problem: the Europe that the formula "Belarus into Europe" invites it to join today, as a cultural and political space, may no longer exist in its present form. And a Belarus that has freed itself from communism and from Lukashenka's post-communist regime should not end up back in a "quasi-communist broth". Vladimir Pastukhov develops a similar idea: the current right wave may prove short, while the potential the left has built up could, if the social and economic crisis deepens, unfold into a much longer .
Pastukhov adds an important caveat that is easy to miss. He himself contrasts the historical experience of "core", Western, Europe with that of Russia and Eastern Europe: the former remembers the internal threat of fascism far better, the latter that of communism. So the same left turn may be perceived and play out differently in different parts of Europe, depending on historical experience and on which threats each region considers most serious.
There is a second point. Even if we accept Usov's and Pastukhov's hypothesis, a "left Europe" is unlikely to follow a single recipe. The word "left" covers very different things: social-democratic redistribution, cultural progressivism, anti-capitalism, attitudes towards NATO, and the degree of tolerance for political pluralism. They cannot be placed on a single scale. In different countries these elements may combine in very different ways.
To extend Usov's culinary metaphor, on the the broth may look more like solyanka, while in parts of Western Europe it may be a much thicker "red borscht". This is not an exact map of Europe in 2040, only an illustration of one simple principle: even with a shared left turn, the regional "recipes" will stay different.