Focus Intermarium
Structural geopolitical analysis between the Baltic and the Black Sea
2040

Europe after the right wave

Thesis

If a left turn follows Europe's right wave, it will differ from one part of the continent to another. A security architecture of its own is already taking shape on the eastern flank, and the question for Belarus is whether it can join before the rules are written without it.

≈ 6 min read · 6 sections

01 / RECIPES
One turn, different recipes
Even a shared left turn will play out differently across Europe: historical memory and the sense of threat change what goes into it.
02 / AXES
Two axes of fault lines
How radical the left turn is and whether a country sees Russia as a threat are two separate axes, and one does not predict the other.
03 / FLANK
Peace without a sense of security
If Russia keeps the capacity for new aggression, defence will remain the eastern flank's priority for decades, and the architecture built around it will outlive changes of government.
04 / BELARUS
A latecomer
As long as Minsk stays in Russia's military domain, its neighbours build their security without Belarus, and Belarus will have to come back to rules already in place.
I

One broth, different recipes

In brief Europe's right wave may give way to a long left turn, but it will look different in different parts of Europe.

Pavel Usov writes that in 10–15 years a democratic Belarus may face a paradoxical problem: the Europe that the formula "Belarus into Europe" invites it to join today, as a cultural and political space, may no longer exist in its present form. And a Belarus that has freed itself from communism and from Lukashenka's post-communist regime should not end up back in a "quasi-communist broth". Vladimir Pastukhov develops a similar idea: the current right wave may prove short, while the potential the left has built up could, if the social and economic crisis deepens, unfold into a much longer .

Pastukhov adds an important caveat that is easy to miss. He himself contrasts the historical experience of "core", Western, Europe with that of Russia and Eastern Europe: the former remembers the internal threat of fascism far better, the latter that of communism. So the same left turn may be perceived and play out differently in different parts of Europe, depending on historical experience and on which threats each region considers most serious.

There is a second point. Even if we accept Usov's and Pastukhov's hypothesis, a "left Europe" is unlikely to follow a single recipe. The word "left" covers very different things: social-democratic redistribution, cultural progressivism, anti-capitalism, attitudes towards NATO, and the degree of tolerance for political pluralism. They cannot be placed on a single scale. In different countries these elements may combine in very different ways.

To extend Usov's culinary metaphor, on the the broth may look more like solyanka, while in parts of Western Europe it may be a much thicker "red borscht". This is not an exact map of Europe in 2040, only an illustration of one simple principle: even with a shared left turn, the regional "recipes" will stay different.

II

Two axes of fault lines

In brief Europe's future fault lines will run along two independent axes: how radical the left turn is, and whether a country sees Russia as a threat.

Europe's future fault lines may then run along two relatively independent axes at once.

The first is how radical the left turn becomes. In some countries it may stay within ordinary social-democratic politics; in others it may go further, towards an anti-capitalist agenda; and in the most radical version it may start to put ideologically defined goals above political pluralism and liberal limits on power.

The second is whether a country sees Russia as a threat. Geography and historical memory do matter here, but they are not destiny. Proximity to Russia and the experience of Russian expansion make it more likely that containing Russia remains a long-term priority, but on their own they do not guarantee political unity.

That is why the two axes should not be merged into one. A country can turn sharply left and still contain Russia firmly. Or it can stay moderate and look for a compromise with Moscow. Where a country stands on one axis does not determine where it stands on the other.

This hypothesis continues the logic of Contours of the New World by 2035: the world is increasingly organised around regional systems, infrastructure, technology and the capacity for joint action. Ideology still matters, but it is no longer the only axis around which political geography is built.

III

The Europe Belarus would return to

In brief The eastern flank is already getting its own EU programmes, and European security is being assembled from a network of regional coalitions inside the EU and NATO.

If such a Europe begins to take shape, the formula "Belarus into Europe" will not necessarily lose its meaning. Rather, the Europe to which Belarus would return will itself change.

And this is no longer pure futurology. In February 2026 the European Commission singled out the EU's eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine: territories of nine countries, from Finland to Bulgaria, with specific challenges in security, infrastructure, the economy and demography. This list is much broader than any hypothetical , so on its own it does not create a political bloc. But it already puts on paper what is plain to see: the EU's eastern border has its own set of problems that require their own policy.

The same can be seen in the Commission's Readiness Roadmap 2030. Eastern Flank Watch is one of its four flagship projects: surveillance, drone and counter-drone capabilities, electronic warfare and operational coordination in close cooperation with NATO. For now it is a roadmap with a set of milestones, not yet a working system. But the direction of travel is set.

European security is unlikely to be built as a single bloc under a single sign. The Joint Expeditionary Force () shows another path: ten Northern European NATO members — the UK, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries and the Baltic states — have their own regional coalition, which complements NATO and does not try to replace it. The EU and NATO remain common to all, but inside them a network of overlapping regional coalitions, projects, procurement and plans is growing: a Europe of "variable geometry". This network is how the new is taking shape.

In such an architecture Berlin is more likely to become a connecting link between pan-European resources, industry and the needs of the eastern flank than a predetermined bridge back to Moscow. Economic pragmatism towards Russia remains a possible, but not a necessary, option.

IV

Peace without a sense of security

In brief If the war ends without a Russian victory but without Russia losing the capacity for new aggression, defence will remain the eastern flank's top priority for decades.

Much will depend on how Russia's war against Ukraine ends. If it ends without a clear Russian victory, but also without Russia losing the capacity and readiness for new aggression, the eastern flank may get not peace in the full sense but . Low trust in agreements and the expectation that Moscow will rebuild its forces could make defence the flank's top priority for decades.

A shared threat is not necessarily stronger than ideology. But if the threat is seen as lasting, the infrastructure, joint procurement, plans, interoperability of armed forces and accumulated trust built around it can outlive more than one change of government. That is why security cooperation has more inertia than electoral cycles.

V

And where will Belarus be in this Europe?

In brief As long as Minsk stays in Russia's military domain, its neighbours build their security without Belarus, and Belarus will have to come back to rules already in place.

For Belarus the main risk is not that "Europe will run out of room". Geography is not going anywhere, and an independent Belarus will always matter a great deal to its neighbours. But a security architecture can be built without Belarus, and with the threat that may come from its territory in mind.

As long as Minsk stays in Russia's military domain, its neighbours will design infrastructure, plans and procedures without Belarusian participation. Interoperability, trust and mutual commitments will accumulate among other countries.

If in 10–15 years it again becomes possible to say "Belarus into Europe" in earnest, the door will not necessarily be closed. But Belarus may have to come back not as a co-founder of the new architecture but as a latecomer adapting to ready-made rules. The price of entry will be not only democratisation but also restoring independent control over its territory and security forces, breaking critical military dependencies on Russia and, above all, regaining its neighbours' trust.

VI

Ukraine, and Intermarium as a function

In brief How Ukraine is brought into European defence will decide whether a dense network of states forms around it: Intermarium as a function rather than an organisation.

Ukraine is one of the main mechanisms of the future architecture. The same Readiness Roadmap 2030 calls Ukraine a key part of European defence readiness, provides for its inclusion in , and for the full integration of Ukraine's defence industry with Europe's.

This can cut both ways. If Ukraine is broadly included in joint planning, production and the system of guarantees, it could bind the whole European architecture together. But if EU and NATO countries diverge over the cost of guarantees, the risk of direct confrontation with Russia and the sharing of obligations, narrower coalitions of those ready to go beyond the common consensus may form around Ukraine.

This is where one of the main fault lines of future Europe may run. And Intermarium need not then be an organisation of that name, a separate alliance or the gravedigger of the EU. It may emerge as a function: a dense network of states for which containing Russia remains a long-term priority and which therefore integrate their defence infrastructure, logistics, planning and production more deeply.

Such a network can exist inside the EU, NATO and parallel regional coalitions at the same time. It need not even split Europe: under certain conditions regional specialisation could, on the contrary, make the common architecture stronger. The main question for Belarus will then be not whether Europe stays attractive, but whether Belarus manages to take part in shaping its own part of Europe before the basic rules of that part are written without it.

The outcome of the war and the way Ukraine is brought into the new architecture will set the external conditions. But whether Belarus can use them will also depend on Belarus itself: on preserving its , its own institutions and the ability to restore real rather than nominal sovereignty.

Analytical essay as of October 19, 2026.